Liberalized Markets Have More Stable Exchange Rates: Short-Run Evidence from Four Transition Countries by Aleš Bulíø
206 Finance a úvûr – Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 55, 2005, ã. 5-6
UDC: 336.748
JEL Classification: F31, F33, C32
Keywords: exchange rate – endogenous liquidity – error-correction mechanism – nonlinearity
Liberalized Markets Have More Stable
Exchange Rates:
Short-Run Evidence from Four Transition Coutries
Ale‰ BULÍ¤*
1. Introduction
This paper examines the hypothesis that financial market liberalization
can create a basis for more stable exchange rates, as deviations of exchange
rates from equilibrium levels, defined here as the Hodrick-Prescott filter,
bring forth stabilizing flows of liquidity. This “endogenous liquidity” hy-
pothesis is relevant in the context of the gradual switch from pegs to floats
in Central European countries – both to the extent that pegs are more dif-
ficult to maintain in liquid markets that respond quickly to participants’
changing perceptions and to the extent that such markets create more fa-
vorable conditions for a market-determined exchange rate.
Models of foreign exchange markets with endogenously provided liqui-
dity assume that large deviations from longer-term pricing levels attract
marginal liquidity into the market, which in turn speeds up the market’s
return toward its trend-based value (Sarno, 2003). Hence, markets with
a large number of informational traders or with deep order books ought to
have smaller and shorter deviations of the exchange rate from trend.
The fact that endogenous liquidity (the client order flow) can affect market
exchange rates is well known, and Faruqee and Redding (1999), Evans and
Lyons (2002), Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2003), and Derviz (2004) present
theoretical models of endogenous liquidity and foreign exchange mi-
crostructure that capture this impact. Empirically, the liquidity effect has
been shown by Faruqee and Redding (1999) on a sample of G-7 currencies,
and the order flow effect by Evans and Lyons (2002).
We tested the endogenous liquidity hypothesis using daily and weekly ex-
change rate data for the U.S. dollar and euro against the Czech and Slovak
korunas, Hungarian forint, and Polish zloty for the relatively tranquil
1998–2002 period. First, we examined the statistical properties of the se-
ries and found excess kurtosis present in the exchange rate returns. Se-
cond, we identified transitory movements and trends in the data using
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the Hodrick-Prescott filter. While the filter sidesteps the problem of pro-
longed misalignment, the medium-term exchange rate is what we observe
in the data, it is not equivalent to the fundamental-based exchange rate.
Finally, we tested the speed-of-adjustment hypothesis within an error-cor-
rection framework, finding results comparable to those of Faruqee and Red-
ding (1999).
The results are broadly supportive of the endogenous liquidity hypothe-
sis as the effects of endogenous liquidity are comparable to those of the ran-
dom walk in exchange rate determination. The results also suggest that
early foreign-exchange market and financial-account liberalization might
explain the resulting faster-than-average adjustment of some national cur-
rencies to short-term deviations from the trend, even if the trend itself may
reflect prolonged misalignment. Liberalized and comparatively large mar-
kets, such as the Czech Republic, are likely to be more stable than those
that are smaller, such as the Slovak Republic, or less fully liberalized ones,
such as Hungary in the late 1990s.
Other results indicate that the speed of adjustment of national exchange
rates is typically faster vis-a `-vis the euro as opposed to the dollar, an intu-
itive consequence of the region’s link to the euro area. These results also
seem to be in line with the finding that volatility of exchange rates in the re-
gion appears to be only loosely related to the national exchange rate ar-
rangements (Darvas – Szapáry, 2000), (Wickham, 2002), or (Canales-Kril-
jenko – Habermeier, 2004). In addition, our results imply that central banks
should not be overly concerned with short-run volatility of their national
exchange rates, given the self-correcting tendencies.
The paper is organized as follows. After discussing the model and sty-
lized facts, we examine the data properties and outline the empirical tech-
niques. In the following section we present our results. The final section
concludes.
2. A Model of Short-term Exchange Rate Determination
Macroeconomists have long observed that exchange rates – both in no-
minal and real terms – are more volatile than would seem to be justified by
conventional macroeconomic models and that the models’ short-term ex-
planatory power is limited (Meese – Rogoff, 1983). Clearly, exchange rates
can remain fairly long outside of the “fair” value, be it based on funda-
mental- or equilibrium-based calculations. In contrast, models augmented
with microeconomic variables – such as the order flow of foreign exchange
in the field of microstructure finance – seem to do much better in the short
term.1
1 Order flow is defined as the net of buyer-initiated and seller-initiated orders. In conventional
macroeconomic models actual trades are typically not related to exchange rate movements. Em-
pirical examples of the link between order flow and daily exchange rate returns were docu-
mented for the U.S. dollar/deutsche mark and Czech koruna/euro rates by Evans and Lyons
(2002) and Derviz (2004), respectively. Unfortunately, the existing order flow data have been
collected in an ad hoc fashion and are yet to be tested in a long-run sample. For example,
the Evans and Lyons paper uses a four-month period in 1996 and Derviz’s data run from mid-
-1999 until end-2001.2.1 Foreign Exchange Markets in the Short Run
In reality, foreign exchange flows and exchange rates are linked endoge-
nously. Only a fraction of foreign exchange trading is related to a desire to
take a particular asset position, for the purposes of either financial invest-
ment or foreign trade activity, and theremainder is initiated by some traders
providing liquidity to other traders for an expected profit. The expected
profit may be based on asudden departure from alonger-term level of theex-
change rate or an increase in the bid-ask spread. Intuitively, large and sud-
den deviations from the longer-term level of the exchange rate would either
activate limit orders set by the existing traders or attract new traders into
the market, accelerating the exchange rate’s return back to its longer-term
level. While this may be a typical reaction to most deviations from the trend,
it could be attenuated by foreign exchange trading based on chartist or tech-
nical analysis techniques.
Market participants are likely to place large limit orders only in deep and
transparent markets. Taking a clue from the theory of finance: “investors
tend to invest in instruments they are aware of” (Merton, 1987). On the one
hand, knowing that the market for a given currency is deep, as for exam-
ple where there is a large volume of limit orders on exchange rate move-
ment in either direction away from trend, agents would presumably be less
prone to initiate sharp price adjustment to nonfundamental news. On
the other hand, the return to longer-term equilibrium values ought to be
faster with a deep market, because those limit orders would be activated or
new market makers would enter such a market quickly to take advantage
of the profit opportunity.2 In reality, the former effect is likely to dominate
the latter: the number of foreign exchange dealers in transition countries
has been low and stable in the short run. Controlling for exchange rate
regimes, foreign exchange market history, central banks’interventions, both
open and hidden, and so on, deep markets ought to exhibit faster adjust-
ment to longer-term levels of exchange rates.
In contrast, central bank interventions should not have a significant
smoothing impact on the foreign exchange market. Contrary to the con-
ventional view of interventions as an instrument of stabilizing short-term
fluctuations, Central European central banks were mostly “leaning against
the wind”, trying to slow down real exchange rate appreciation. We discuss
the evidence in favor of this view later in the paper.
2.2 An Outline of a Theoretical Model
How would an economy with endogenous liquidity operate? Faruqee and
Redding (1999, 2001) and Evans and Lyons (2002) employed three-period,
short-term models that share some salient features and we will use a sim-
plified version thereof to motivate theempirical work in our paper. Arguably,
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2 The empirical literature provides some support for this hypothesis. For example, Devereux
and Lane (2003) found that high levels of financial linkages between creditor and developing
countries resulted in a lower level of bilateral exchange rate variability.the Evans and Lyons model is geared toward explaining intra-day move-
ments in the exchange rate, while Faruqee and Redding are concerned with
somewhat longer periods. However, the adjustment in both models is ef-
fected through similar processes.
Consider a three-period economy in which trading influences the price of
foreign currency (the model is derived formally in Annex I). Ignoring dif-
ferences between the direct and brokered markets, the economy is popu-
lated by two types of agents. First, noninformational (“noise”) traders who
trade primarily for purposes of financial investment or foreign trade acti-
vity and may push the exchange rate away from the best estimate of the li-
quidation price in each period. These traders do not have a longer-term view
of the exchange rate and typically buy foreign exchange at a given price.
Second, informational traders (or market makers), who provide desired li-
quidity in exchange for an expected profit to be realized in period 3 when
the market is liquidated. These traders speculate, with a view of returning
the rate to a market clearing level.3
The asset will have a liquidation price (P3) in the final period that is not
known with certainty prior to T3. The asset is being traded in the first two
periods, T1and T2, resulting in prices P1and P2, gradually improving thepre-
cision of the estimate of P3, i.e., 1EP3 and 2EP3. The first- and second-period
estimates of P3 are normally distributed around P3 with posterior sample
variances of  1
2 and  2
2, respectively, such that  1
2  2
2. Naturally, if nonin-
formational traders’orders were completely absent, the second-period price
would be equal to the expectation of the third-period price. The resulting
time line of exchange rate determination is described in Figure 1.
The model assumption of gradual price discovery ( 1
2  2
2) implies that
the expected exchange rate will drift toward its longer-term value. How-
ever, the speed of adjustment is endogenous: the bigger the absolute value
of the discrepancy between the expected final and realized first-period ex-
change rates   1EP3 – P1  , the deeper the order book will be in the second
period and the faster the reversion to P3.
2.3 An Error-correction Framework
The principal implication of the Faruqee-Redding model is that the speed
of adjustment of exchange rates toward their longer-term values is propor-
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Period 1 (T1)P eriod 2 (T2)P eriod 3 (T3)
First-period The net 1EP3 is Public Second-period 2EP3 is Public  The market is
informational demand revealed trading informational revealed trading liquidated  at
traders enter  of “noise” results traders enter results a price P3
the market and traders in a rate the market and in a rate
limit orders are is an- P1 limit orders are  P2
set nounced set
FIGURE 1 Time Line of Exchange Rate Determination
3 Which particular instruments are used by individual market participants is a side issue, de-
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tionately higher when the deviation from the trend level is large and the or-
der book is deep. While the former hypothesis is directly testable, the lat-
ter is not, given the absence of long-run order flow data.
The empirical testing of exchange rate developments consists of two parts.
First, defining e as the log of the exchange rate, we separate its longer-term
trend level (f), which is presumably affected by fundamental factors, from
the effects of transitory demand (n):
e=f+n (1)
The decomposition was done using univariate techniques, namely the Ho-
drick-Prescott filter.4 The filter was used to characterize the trend portion
of the exchange rate, and the difference from the actual exchange rate was
used to characterize the transitory demand.
The pros and cons of using the above univariate techniques are obvious.
First, we avoid the troublesome joint testing of the endogenous liquidity hy-
pothesis and an ad hoc chosen model of long-term exchange rate determi-
nation as in (Meese – Rogoff, 1983). Second, the Hodrick-Prescott filter
sidesteps the problem of prolonged misalignment – the medium-term ex-
change rate is what we observe in the data. The flip side is, of course, that
filtering away short-term fluctuations is not equivalent to the fundamen-
tal-based exchange rate. It is noteworthy that the literature offers very lit-
tle agreement on what is the correct method of computing equilibrium ex-
change rates, see the survey in (Bulíﬁ – ·mídková, 2005). Moreover, filtering
does not shed light on the nature of the trend process: the underlying trend
can be stochastic, supporting an I(1) variable, or deterministic with broken
trend and supporting an I(0) variable. Applying the selected filters we im-
pose a fixed speed of adjustment of the trend to actual developments in all
periods and all countries.5 On balance, however, we see the disadvantages
of joint testing as more serious than those of mechanical filtering.
Second, we explore the nature of the short-term fluctuations. The model
predicts that the transitory departure from the trend ought to be short-lived
and the exchange rate would revert in expectation to the trend value of
the exchange rate (Annex I):
 tE nt+1 nt     <  nt  (2)
where the expected value of the transitory component of the exchange rate
at time t+1 is conditional on its value at time t.
Moreover, the model predicts the nonlinear mean reversion to be posi-
tively related to the initial value of the short-term deviation from trend (n):
4 We use the common rule for determining the bandwidth parameter   for the Hodrick-Prescott
filter: 100 times its frequency-squared. Hence,   takes the value 14,400, 260,100, and 6,250,000
for monthly, weekly, and daily data, respectively. The results using the kernel-based smoother
(the Epanechnikov kernel) are not materially different from the Hodrick-Prescott filter, includ-
ing spurious autocorrelation (Cogley – Nason, 1995).
5 For example, the market may be characterized by two or more adjustment processes: one
through private agent interactions and the other through central bank interventions. Presum-
ably, the monetary authority is concerned less with the speed of adjustment of the nominal ex-
change rate than with finding a particular level of the real exchange rate.211 Finance a úvûr – Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 55, 2005, ã. 5-6
d nt – tE nt+1  
–––––––––––– > 0 (3)
dnt
In other words, the error correction term in the numerator ought to be in-
creasing in the initial departure from the trend.6
The above univariate error-correction mechanism can be tested in a sim-
ple equation:
x
 et =  nt–1 +   nt–1 3 +   i et–i +  t (4)
1
where nt = et – ft is the difference from the Hodrick-Prescott filter; the pa-
rameter   captures the proportional part of the mean reversion (error-cor-
rection) process; and the parameter   captures the additional mean rever-
sion owing to theendogenous liquidity hypothesis.7Theadvantage of acubic
term – as opposed to a quadratic term – is that it preserves the sign of
the transitory component. In addition, equation 4 can include lagged de-
pendent variables and, hence, it becomes a direct test of the random walk
hypothesis of exchange rate.
Given that mean reversion entails negative autocorrelation, both the pro-
portional and additional error-correction mechanisms imply negative ex-
pected values for   and  . Should the endogenous liquidity hypothesis be
rejected, the estimated value of   would have to be zero. Hence, in the sub-
sequent sections we will test both the sign and significance of the   and  
coefficients for different country series and time periods. Of course, the two
error-correction processes are not independent: an identically fast return to
trend can be achieved either through “high”   and “low”  , or vice versa,
“low”   and “high”  . While the former example would portray a deep, fast
reacting market, the latter would portray a shallow market, which needs
a major departure from trend to attract additional liquidity. Although
the speed of adjustment could be the same in those examples, the paths of
the exchange rate would differ. The null hypothesis of the random walk im-
plies that  i is equal to zero.
3. Stylized Facts about Foreign Exchange Markets
3.1 The Liberalization Process in Central Europe and Market
Liquidity
Although the national exchange rate arrangements differed in the initial
stages of transition, theauthorities in theCzech Republic, Hungary, Poland,
and the Slovak Republic (also known as the Visegrád Four) eventually
6 Granger and Siklos (1997) addressed a similar problem, namely that the cointegrating rela-
tionship can be nonlinear in nature and, moreover, depend on the nature of the policy regime
in place. See also the review of nonlinear adjustment models in (Sarno, 2003).
7 An obvious disadvantage of this specification is multicolinearity between n and (n)3. It seems
to be a relatively small price to pay: we loose some efficiency, but our estimated coefficients re-
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TABLE 1 Exchange Rate Regimes and Capital Account Developments in Selected Count-
ries,1991–2002a
Country Period De jure regime Band Periodic Capital  Account
Devalua- Developments
tions
  0.5 percent,
January 1993 changed to No









January 1991  changed from Yes,
–February Soft peg nil to   22 deva-
1995   2.25 percent in  luations
December 1994
March 1995 
  2.25 percent,
Hungaryb
–September
Crawling peg change to 
Yes
2001





discretionary    15 percent ...
interventions)
Gradually
changed from  October 1991 
Crawling peg nil to  
Yes –March





No ... April 12, 2000 float
Extended in
several steps
January 1993 from 
–September Peg   1.5 percent in  No
Slovak 1998 January 1996 to 














until June 2001 
Government decree;









put off by the fiscal-
-monetary mix
Similar steps if 




little outside interest 
in Slovak koruna paper
Notes: a This table contains anofficial classification of thenational exchange rate arrangement as declared by thena-
tional monetary authorities. However, Reinhart and Rogoff (2002) have shown that de jure as opposed to
de facto exchange rate arrangements can differ. For example, the early Czech, Hungarian, and Slovak pegs
are reclassified as crawls, Poland’s crawling peg during 1991–95 is reclassified as a dual market rate ar-
rangement, and so on.
b Step devaluation (9 percent) in March 1995. Schardax (2002) argued that the widening of the intervention
band, followed in October 2001 by the adoption of an inflation targeting regime, is equivalent to a mana-
ged floating regime.
c step devaluation (6 percent) in December 1995
Sources: (Darvas – Szapáry, 2000), (Schardax, 2002), and central banks’ official web sites
adopted managed floating arrangements, gradually building up liquidity in
their foreign exchange markets (Table 1).8 Notwithstanding the similarity
in the choice of the arrangement during 2000–2002, the volume of trading
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FIGURE 2 Average Daily Foreign Exchange Turnover and Monthly Foreign Exchange Inter-
ventions, 1997–2002a
Note: a Average daily foreign exchange turnover (for months of April and October) and monthly foreign exchange
intervention data are in the left or right columns, respectively.214 Finance a úvûr – Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 55, 2005, ã. 5-6
to the history of the market: for example, in the mid-1990s the Czech mar-
ket was exposed to large privatization-related foreign exchange trading with
substantial exchange rate risk, necessitating early development of the de-
rivative market, as compared to the less exposed market in the Slovak 
Republic or the tightly controlled Hungarian market. In terms of market
size, the Czech koruna was the most heavily traded, while the market for
the Slovak koruna was the thinnest. The Polish market was large in le-
vels, but in relation to the size of the Polish economy it was comparable to
the Slovak market.10 It is noteworthy that all four countries use the same
trading system: Reuters. Also, the number of active traders and market
makers, most of which are foreign owned, was broadly similar (Canales-
-Kriljenko, 2004).
Our sample countries differed also in terms of capital-flow liberalization.
In terms of institutional control, Czech financial-account transactions were
freed in the second half of the 1990s and the koruna was floated subse-
quently. These developments resulted in large daily turnovers and fast-
-growing derivative markets. The Slovak Republic followed a similar path,
although with much slower turnover growth. In contrast, Hungary and
Poland maintained narrow-band crawling peg regimes and both formal and
informal capital-flow controls until the early 2000s, with correspondingly
small turnover.
We also looked at two other measures of institutional liberalization and
market depth, namely national currency eurobonds and real interest rates.
First, let us consider the volume of the eurobond market in the national
currency. While the Czech koruna-denominated market has had around
40 new, private issues per year for the past six years (with outstanding eu-
robonds of more than USD 3 billion), forint-denominated eurobonds were
first issued in 2001 (with an outstanding volume of about USD 100 million).
No Slovak-koruna denominated eurobonds have been issued yet, showing
the Slovak Republic’s slow progress in foreign exchange market develop-
ment, and no summary data are available for Poland. Second, short-term
real interest rates seems to tell a very similar story. The 2002 average real
one-month interbank rate of the Czech koruna was 1.6 percent, practically
identical to theGerman interbank rate of thesame maturity. While theHun-
garian rate was somewhat higher at 3.5 percent, the Slovak rate rose to
4.3 percent, and the Polish rate peaked at almost 7 percent.
Unfortunately, none of the above indicators provides an explicit measure
of foreign exchange market liquidity and depth. For example, trading vo-
8 This classification is based on self-assessment by individual countries. Reinhart and Rogoff
(2002) or Bofinger and Wollmershaeuser (2001) have shown that the actual behavior of exchange
rates can be consistent with regimes different from those declared officially. See also (Ghosh et
al., 2003) for a critique of model-based assessments of exchange rate regimes.
9 Nevertheless, the data exhibit a fair amount of spatial correlation, confirming the intuitive
assumption that all four Central European currencies were subject to similar exchange rate
shocks. See (Kóbor – Szekély, 2004) for a model of a two-regime switching exchange-rate pro-
cess in Visegrád Four countries. They find that two pair-wise correlations, between the Czech
and Slovak korunas and between the forint and zloty, dominate the four-way relationship.
10 Poland’s population in the late 1990s was almost 40 million, as compared to about 10 million
for the Czech Republic and Hungary and 5 million for the Slovak Republic. See also other com-
parisons at (Bofinger – Wollmershaeuser, 2001).215 Finance a úvûr – Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 55, 2005, ã. 5-6
lumes are only imperfect substitutes, dependent on the chosen structure of
the market: ceteris paribus, a market with multiple market makers is go-
ing to record much higher trading volume than a broker-based market
(Bofinger – Wollmershaeuser, 2001). High trading volumes in mid-1998 in
the Czech Republic or end-2002 in Hungary may indicate periods of mar-
ket turmoil rather than overall high liquidity. Similarly, the number of trad-
able instruments is only an indication of potential liquidity and, for exam-
ple, the volumes on the domestic-currency eurobond markets have been
rather thin. Finally, real interest rates may have more to do with overall
macroeconomic conditions and policy response to trend real appreciation
than with a precise measurement of market depth.
The available data provide an indication of market liquidity, not a pre-
cise measure thereof. These data suggest that the Czech market was
the most liquid from the outset, irrespective of the subsequent decline in
turnover. The remaining markets are less liquid, although the Hungarian
market picked up substantially following thefloating of theforint. In terms
of the empirical model defined above, the estimates of the nonlinear speed
of adjustment,  , ought to be high in absolute terms for the Czech koruna
for the early data and lower in the later data, possibly accompanied by 
increasing absolute-value  s. In the remaining countries, the estimated
absolute-value  s might be increasing in time as their currencies were
floated.
3.2 National Exchange Rate Developments
End-period daily, weekly, and monthly exchange rate data from May 1998
until December 2002 were collected. The data were expressed in foreign-
-currency units (U.S. dollar and euro) per unit of domestic currency and lo-
garithms were taken of all series. All the series were found to be nonsta-
tionary, of order I(1). The estimated coefficient of the lagged variable in
the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) regressions was typically around 0.99,
indicating that the series follows a random walk. The weekly Slovak ko-
runa series appeared to be stationary, although the estimated coefficient of
the lagged variable remained high at around 0.90–0.91.
We observed that the nominal volatility in our sample does not seem to
be linked directly to theexchange rate arrangement in place (Figure3and 4).
For example, both the dollar and euro deviations of the Czech currency from
the trend under the floating arrangement appear to be smaller than the Po-
lish currency deviations under the dollar/euro basket crawling peg ar-
rangement. Indeed, the only period of markedly low volatility in our sam-
ple was the one-year Hungarian experiment with a tight crawling peg
vis-à-vis the euro from about December 1999 until November 2000, follow-
ing the forint crawling peg against the dollar/euro basket.
The dependent variable for the error-correction mechanism suggested
above is the differenced series, and its properties are shown in Table 2.11
All differenced series were found to be stationary, that is, of order I(0), and
the estimated coefficients of the lagged variable in the ADF test were in-
variantly smaller than 0.20. A few observations are worth noting. First,
the volatility of the euro exchange rates was typically lower than that of216 Finance a úvûr – Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 55, 2005, ã. 5-6
dollar rates, as most foreign exchange trading has been done in deutsche
mark and subsequently in euro, an intuitive consequence of the region’s
trading and investment link to Western Europe. The Polish zloty is an out-
lier: the estimated volatility vis-à-vis the dollar and euro are essentially
identical, even after the dollar/euro basket was called off in early 2000. It
appears that dealers in the zloty market look up to the dollar as much as
to the euro, perhaps because these traders are U.S. based (Panthaki, 2004).
The relative volume of U.S. dollar trading in Poland in 2001 was almost
twice as large as in the Czech Republic and Hungary (Canales-Kriljenko,
2004).
Second, all daily and most weekly and monthly series fail the normality
test at the 1 percent significance level, primarily on account of excess kur-
tosis present in the data.12 The distributions of the differenced series have
“fat tails,” that is, we observe a number of surprisingly high daily returns,
FIGURE 3 The Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and the Slovak Republic:Daily U.S.Dollar and
Euro Exchange Rates and the Hodrick-Prescott Filter, May 1998–December 2002a
Note: a The Hodrick-Prescott filter parameter   has been set to 6,250,000. All data are in logs.
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11 We confirmed the presence of cointegrating relationships between the exchange rate in le-
vels and its Hodrick-Prescott filter using the Johansen and Juselius (1990) technique and ob-
served that the speed of adjustment is fairly slow. Both results are intuitive: first, the Hodrick-
-Prescott filter is a dynamic measure of central tendency and, second, the actual exchange rates
hovered above or below its trend for relatively long periods.
12 The outliers are the weekly dollar series for Hungary and the Slovak Republic and also
the monthly euro series for the Slovak Republic. As discussed earlier, however, the dollar re-
turns are mostly a product of cross-rate developments. In addition, the weekly and monthly se-
ries are short with only 234 and 56 observations, respectively.a typical property of most high-frequency financial data (Figure 4). Some-
what surprisingly, however, these results differ very little whether we look
at the full sample – during which some countries pegged or crawled – or fo-
cus only on thepost-October 2001 sample during which all countries floated.
This finding is consistent with the Darvas and Szapáry (2000) argument of
exchange rate arrangement irrelevancy for exchange rate volatility; see also
(Wickham, 2002).
We observed that the mean duration of a departure from the trend was
around 40 trading days, consistent with a slow speed of adjustment in
the cointegrating relationship that was observed between the raw series
and its Hodrick-Prescott filter (Figure 4). Each currency’s exchange rate
had 20–30 periods when it remained above or below the trend (Hodrick-
-Prescott filter) for at least 5 trading days. Of the four currencies under con-
sideration, during 2002 the Czech koruna had the highest number of such
transitory deviations vis-à-vis the euro trend (seven) and their average du-
ration was the shortest (less than 30 trading days). In contrast, the Slovak
koruna had only three deviations from the trend, but they lasted on ave-
rage four months. The forint and zloty were somewhere in between with
5–6 deviations. Most of those events were consistent with the hypothesis of
endogenous liquidity provision – a gradual buildup of deviations from
the trend followed, from a certain moment, with a swift adjustment back
to the trend.
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FIGURE 4 The Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and the Slovak Republic: Daily U.S. Dollar
and Euro Exchange Rate Returns and Deviations from the Hodrick-Prescott Filter,
May 1998–December 2002a
Note: a First differences and differences from the Hodrick-Prescott filter. All data are in logs.



























































EUR/SLK218 Finance a úvûr – Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 55, 2005, ã. 5-6
TABLE 2 Dollar and Euro Exchange Rate Daily Returns: Sample Moments and Kurtosis tests,
May 1998–December 2002
Czech Republic Hungary Poland Slovak Republic
Dollar Euro Dollar Euro Dollar Euro Dollar Euro
A. Daily data (n = 1,165)
Mean 2.548E-5 5.738E-5 –3.837E-5 –6.472E-5 –5.570E-5 –2.381E-5 –6.586E-5 –3.397E-5
Std. Deviation 0.00334 0.00202 0.00290 0.00159 0.00315 0.00349 0.00317 0.00174
Skewnessa 0.0585 –0.3171 0.0185 –1.3463 –0.5352 –0.6227 –0.3409 –5.1425
Excess kurtosisb 1.3052 5.3962 1.7769 18.792 10.359 8.7817 4.5902 88.746
Normality testc 61.99*** 503.9*** 103.4*** 1514.8*** 1514.4*** 841.8*** 393.2*** 1066.2***
Of which: May 1998–September 2001 (n = 881)
Mean –5.482E-5 3.770E-5 –1.437E-4 –5.118E-5 –1.063E-4 –1.351E-5 –1.594E-4 6.692E-5
Std. Deviation 0.00341 0.00197 0.00296 0.00160 0.00337 0.00369 0.00330 0.00183
Skewnessa –0.0565 –0.6455 –0.0222 –1.7219 –0.4740 –0.6543 –0.4130 –5.8168
Excess kurtosisb 0.9731 6.5395 1.8247 23.586 10.319 9.127 4.959 94.834
Normality testc 28.88*** 401.99*** 81.87*** 1206.4*** 860.74*** 657.92*** 318.37*** 719.59***
October 2001–December 2002 (n = 284)
Mean 2.907E-4 9.904E-5 2.907E-4 9.904E-5 6.473E-5 –1.269E-4 2.589E-4 6.733E-5
Std. Deviation 0.00313 0.00220 0.00269 0.00148 0.00242 0.00278 0.00272 0.00142
Skewnessa 0.5454 0.4146 0.2576 –0.0893 –0.7947 –0.3767 0.1931 –0.0981
Excess kurtosisb 2.4235 2.6295 1.3477 2.0471 1.9089 1.0555 0.8656 1.6972
Normality testc 34.98*** 44.91*** 18.05*** 36.83*** 25.62*** 12.41*** 9.52*** 27.54***
B. Weekly data (n = 234)
Mean 8.710E-5 2.843E-4 –2.235E-4 –2.638E-5 –3.148E-4 –1.118E-5 3.609E-4 –1.638E-4
Std. Deviation 0.00798 0.00432 0.00658 0.00320 0.00649 0.00647 0.00679 0.00418
Skewnessa 0.1389 –0.9793 0.2010 –1.0245 –0.9177 –1.2818 0.1892 –2.2137
Excess kurtosisb 3.6668 6.0544 0.00561 8.3269 2.9452 3.9448 0.00260 15.786
Normality testc 73.65*** 78.81*** 1.642 129.1*** 29.94*** 43.83*** 1.460 99.25***
C. Monthly data (n = 56)
Mean 5.301E-4 1.193E-3 –7.982E-4 1.351E-4 –1.159E-3 4.950E-4 –1.370E-3 –7.066E-4
Std. Deviation 0.01644 0.00947 0.01121 0.00661 0.01456 0.01383 0.01127 0.00694
Skewnessa 0.3886 –0.4582 0.3912 0.6595 –0.4535 –1.2049 0.0888 –0.3084
Excess kurtosisb 0.8399 2.2613 0.11842 3.2121 1.90459 1.47035 –0.34811 –0.10951
Normality testc 4.417* 13.54*** 1.748 18.77*** 10.751** 16.49*** 0.091 1.05
Notes: a The skewness statistic  1 of a variable x is calculated as , where   is the sample mean and
the standard deviation is based on 1/T. In normal distributions with no skewness the  1 statistic would be
zero.
b The excess kurtosis statistic  2 of a variable x is calculated as      , where   is the sample 
mean and the standard deviation is based on 1/T. In normal distributions with no excess kurtosis the  2
statistic would be zero.
c The normality test is distributed as  2(2). The significance level of the rejection of the hypothesis that the va-
riable under consideration is distributed as a normal variable at 1, 5, and 10 percent are denoted by ***,
**, and *, respectively.
Source: author’s calculations
E[(x– )3]
 1 = –––––––––
(Var[x])3/2
E[(x– )4]
 2 = ––––––––– – 3
(Var[x])2
4. Results
We find that the speed of adjustment in our sample is directly compar-
able to that of G-7 countries in (Faruqee – Redding, 1999). As predicted,
the Czech koruna adjustment was the fastest and the forint adjustment
picked up speed considerably toward the end of the sample period.219 Finance a úvûr – Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 55, 2005, ã. 5-6
The results of estimating equation (4) by ordinary least squares for both
the U.S. dollar and euro exchange rates in each of the four countries 
(the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and the Slovak Republic) are shown
in Tables 3–6. In addition to presenting the results for the daily and weekly
series in Tables 3–4 and 5–6, respectively, we also took into account the dif-
ferent exchange rate regimes. Equation 4 is thus estimated for three sam-
ple periods: (i) May 1998–December 2002, corresponding to the period of
the float of the Czech koruna; (ii) May 2000–December 2002, correspond-
ing to the period of the float of the Polish zloty and Slovak koruna; and
(iii) October 2001–December 2002, corresponding to the period of the float
of the forint. Annex II compares out-of-sample forecasting accuracy (Meese
– Rogoff, 1983) of the various versions of Equation 4 and finds that the pure
random walk model performs quite similarly to the Faruqee-Redding model
without lagged variables, but that the latter model with lagged variables is
superior to either model.
4.1 Daily Data
The results for the daily data are shown in Table 3. As is well known,
the Hodrick-Prescott filter can create spurious serial correlation in de-
trended data (Cogley – Nason, 1995).13 Indeed, a few of the Durbin-Watson
statistics are low, typically in tandem with Pagan’s error autocorrelation
test. Also, the usual tests of heteroskedasticity of residuals are uncomfort-
ably high. Therefore, we present the parameter estimates with standard 
errors corrected for both autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity (HACSE).
The stability of estimated parameters of interest –   and   – was tested in
recursive regressions and the results for the euro rates are shown in Fi-
gure 5.14 The fact that these regressions explain only a limited portion of
the variance of the et variable (1–7 percent) is not surprising – the order flow
drives daily exchange rate fluctuations, not the endogenous liquidity process.
Most point estimates of the mean reversion processes   and   have the ex-
pected signs. We have found only four, statistically insignificant cases in
Poland, and one in the Slovak Republic, where the proportionate mean re-
version process does not hold (  > 0), the implication being that the ex-
change rate tends to drift away from the trend indefinitely. With positive
 s, however, the nonlinear process ( ) overcompensates for the linear one:
when the deviation becomes “large,” the exchange rate adjusts swiftly. In
contrast, the additional mean reversion process fails only for the dollar ex-
change rate in the Slovak Republic (  > 0).
The point estimates of the proportionate mean reversion process ( ) 
indicate that it would take between 7 and 60 days (up to 12 weeks) for 
13 We also tested for another well-known problem of the Hodrick-Prescott filter: the filter fails
at the beginning and end of the time series. Given the length of our series, exclusion of those
observations does not change our results.
14 The structural break in Hungary’s recursive estimates of   and   is explained, of course, by
its move away from the tight crawling peg regime toward a floating one. In line with the ob-
served link between the forint and zloty currencies, the shock was instantly transmitted to
the Polish currency, but not to the Czech or Slovak currencies (Kóbor – Szekély, 2004).220 Finance a úvûr – Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 55, 2005, ã. 5-6
the exchange rate to return to its trend in the absence of the nonlinear pro-
cess. As expected, the speed of adjustment was fastest in the Czech Republic
and slowest in Poland and the Slovak Republic. We also find that it is the li-
FIGURE 5 Recursive Estimates of   and   and Their Two Standard Errors
(Recursive OLS regressions of Euro daily exchange rates)
Note: Daily data; initialization after 400 observations. The time measured in observations is on the horizontal axis
and values of the estimated parameters are on the vertical axis.
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near process that drives the return to trend: evaluated at absolute value
mean, the impact of the linear adjustment process (n) was about ten times
stronger than the impact of the nonlinear process (n)3.
Accounting for nonlinear mean reversion removes some of the excess kur-
tosis from the data. Comparing the excess kurtosis statistics from Table 2
with the excess kurtosis statistics estimated for the residuals from Ta-
bles 3–6, their values are declining across currencies and periods, although
the statistics itself rarely become insignificant.
To test for the presence of random walk and to examine the robustness of
our results to residual autocorrelation, we re-estimated equation 4 with
24 lagged dependent variables included in each regression (Table 4).15 Re-
garding the former question, we find evidence that random walk is present.
TABLE 3 Daily Data without Lagged Dependent Variablesa
Czech Republic Hungary Poland Slovakia
Dollar Euro Dollar Euro Dollar Euro Dollar Euro
Sample period: May 1998–December 2002 (n = 1141)
  –0.01456 –0.02652 –0.03098** –0.02643** 0.02559 –0.00258 –0.03981*** –0.02996***
HACSE (0.0125) (0.0175) (0.0148) (0.0197) (0.0165) (0.0169) (0.0155) (0.0097)
  –32.398* –134.83* –60.062 –82.542 –176.82*** –85.676** –16.872 –10.188
HACSE (16.79) (69.57) (45.65) (161.8) (47.11) (43.52) (36.41) (25.51)
DW 1.93 2.03 1.93 2.00 1.89 2.04 1.89 1.55
Autocor. 2.0061* 2.2105* 1.5362 3.6337*** 1.8494* 1.8948* 2.0595* 11.607***
R 2 0.018 0.027 0.025 0.021 0.061 0.029 0.023 0.017
Sample period: May 2000–December 2002 (n = 654)
  –0.03225** –0.05655** –0.02980 –0.01632 0.02215 0.00375 –0.04837* –0.01693
HACSE (0.0163) (0.0228) (0.0198) (0.0252) (0.0223) (0.0215) (0.0202) (0.0145)
  –9.357 –17.680 –61.777 –141.46 –177.93** –84.406* 4.6477 –51.647
HACSE (17.33) (121.2) (50.54) (178.5) (73.34) (48.64) (44.49) (98.50)
DW 1.91 1.98 1.92 2.00 1.85 1.99 1.95 1.76
Autocor. 1.6491 1.3998 0.7338 3.5054*** 1.3541 0.8074 1.0760 1.9763*
R 2 0.021 0.029 0.028 0.027 0.065 0.030 0.024 0.011
Sample period: October 2001–December 2002 (n = 299)
  –0.03620 –0.06352 –0.03036 –0.02350 –0.00590 0.00976 –0.06766 0.00838
HACSE (0.0367) (0.0409) (0.0329) (0.0231) (0.0333) (0.0225) (0.0428) (0.0194)
  –1.0951 –0.60180 –144.96 –552.04** –319.79* –138.55*** –631.45** –178.87
HACSE (29.37) (173.0) (124.4) (249.9) (180.4) (50.89) (299.3) (116.8)
DW 1.84 1.95 2.00 1.90 1.83 1.98 1.85 1.69
Autocor. 2.2701 1.6882 0.3126 0.9763 1.8579 2.0071* 1.2118 1.3030
R 2 0.019 0.030 0.032 0.046 0.035 0.044 0.071 0.013
Note: a Estimation by ordinary least squares, robust standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity and autocor-
relation are reported in parentheses as ‘HACSE’. The Durbin-Watson and error autocorrelation statistics are
labelled as ‘DW’ and ‘Autocor.’, respectively. The coefficient of determination is R2. The significance level at
1, 5, and 10 percent are denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively. The parameter significance is based on ro-
bust standard errors.
Source: author’s calculations
15 It was not trivial to determine an optimal lag length. The commonly used information crite-
ria – Akaike and Schwartz – suggested lag lengths anywhere between 12 and 38 for individual
currencies and samples. The median value was 24 for daily data and 18 for weekly data.222 Finance a úvûr – Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 55, 2005, ã. 5-6
On the one hand, the estimated parameters of one-period lagged dependent
variables ( et–1) are not statistically different from zero, thus suggesting
consistency with the random walk hypothesis. On the other hand, and more
importantly, the estimated parameters at other lags ( et–1–i) are significant,
although at different lag lengths for various currencies. The lagged terms
are jointly significant (Annex II) and the explained variance in the model (4)
rises sharply. Regarding the latter issue, residual autocorrelation became
less of a problem in most regressions, although a few stubbornly correlated
residuals remained (e.g., the forint/euro series).
In the augmented equation (4) both the coefficients on the proportional
and nonlinear mean reversion increased in magnitude and for many of them
we can reject the null hypothesis of   or  , or both, being equal to zero. For
example, seven out of the twelve estimated   parameters for the euro ex-
change rates are statistically significant and all are negative and large.
Only a handful of the estimated   parameters are positive and none of them
is significantly different from zero.
Note: a 24 lagged values of the dependent variable are included in the regression, but are not reported. Estimation
by ordinary least squares, robust standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation are
reported in parentheses as ‘HACSE’. The Durbin-Watson and error autocorrelation statistics are labelled as
‘DW’ and ‘Autocor.’, respectively. The coefficient of determination is R2. The significance level at 1, 5, and
10 percent are denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively. The parameter significance is based on robust stan-
dard errors.
Source: author’s calculations
TABLE 4 Daily Data with Lagged Dependent Variables a
Czech Republic Hungary Poland Slovakia
Dollar Euro Dollar Euro Dollar Euro Dollar Euro
Sample period: May 1998–December 2002 (n = 1141)
  –0.02603** –0.04146**–0.04714*** –0.03504* 0.01136 –0.01984 –0.05347*** –0.04170***
HACSE (0.0121) (0.0169) (0.0142) (0.0190) (0.0174) (0.0162) (0.0152) (0.0093)
  –44.565*** –172.48** –77.618 –99.9559 –191.97*** –77.6933* –16.402 –37.155***
HACSE (16.86) (78.50) (47.29) (158.7) (57.20) (42.17) (36.34) (14.44)
DW 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 1.99 2.00 2.00 2.01
Autocor. 1.0769 0.8182 0.5858 3.8167*** 0.7565 2.0378** 0.1900 2.8731*
R 2 0.047 0.056 0.052 0.077 0.081 0.076 0.053 0.101
Sample period: May 2000–December 2002 (n = 654)
  –0.04241*** –0.08747*** –0.04340** –0.02055 0.01112 –0.00909 –0.06740*** –0.03568**
HACSE (0.0154) (0.0241) (0.0189) (0.0241) (0.0236) (0.0199) (0.0195) (0.0154)
  –23.125 –52.889 –71.2372 –149.06 –188.91* –86.951* 4.9190 –10.313
HACSE (19.00) (124.7) (52.54) (176.2) (91.74) (48.71) (43.27) (97.73)
DW 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.01 1.99 1.98 2.00 2.01
Autocor. 0.5460 0.9448 0.8339 5.6865*** 6.0222*** 4.1287 0.5122 2.2694**
R 2 0.062 0.068 0.055 0.012 0.094 0.109 0.068 0.079
Sample period: October 2001–December 2002 (n = 299)
  –0.04081 –0.09434** –0.03560 –0.02515 –0.02948 0.00146 –0.13085*** 0.00510
HACSE (0.0328) (0.0455) (0.0346) (0.0261) (0.0377) (0.0191) (0.0504) (0.0178)
  –18.282 –49.546 –199.03 –526.91** –312.92 –166.67*** –759.54** –190.80*
HACSE (31.94) (175.7) (145.4) (254.9) (237.3) (49.00) (348.4) (118.6)
DW 1.99 2.00 2.00 2.03 2.01 2.05 2.00 2.00
Autocor. 0.4484 0.4273 0.3729 4.5363*** 1.4056 1.9929 0.0672 0.7709
R 2 0.100 0.100 0.079 0.127 0.133 0.176 0.162 0.096223 Finance a úvûr – Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 55, 2005, ã. 5-6
Second, the estimated  s increase (and often become statistically signi-
ficant) as we shorten the sample – with the notable exception of the Czech
koruna data – perhaps as a manifestation of additional interest in those
currencies from the side of international foreign exchange market makers.
These findings are consistent with our observations regarding market
depth. Why, then, the decline in  s in the Czech koruna and post-2000 
Hungarian forint results? We see two complementary explanations. First,
the volume of Czech koruna foreign exchange trades peaked at USD 5 bil-
lion per day in late 1998/early 1999 and declined to less than one half there-
after (Figure 2). Second, we interpret declining  s as a sign of a gradually
maturing market: from the recursive estimates we see that as the absolute-
-value  s decline, the absolute-value  s increase (Figure 5). In other words,
these markets no longer require asizable exchange rate shock to start anon-
linear, endogenous-liquidity-driven return back to thetrend, because thepro-
portional part of the mean reversion takes care of the adjustment.
4.2 Weekly data
We re-estimated equation 4 with the weekly data with several objectives
in mind (Tables5and6). First, we can investigate thetime horizon of theen-
dogenous liquidity hypothesis. For example, the speed of adjustment may
be better captured in lower-frequency data. Second, we can explore the ro-
bustness of the daily data results. Third, we can compare our results di-
rectly to those of Faruqee and Redding (1999).
We find little difference in the overall explanatory power of the model
with weekly as compared to daily data. It appears that the nonlinear error
correction mechanism is at play in the same countries as with the daily data
and there is not much information one can use for deciding between
the daily- and weekly-data results. As expected, the weekly data are less
choppy than the daily data and, as a result, the adjusted R2 is somewhat
higher, explaining between 5 and 10 percent of the variance of the depen-
dent variable.
Similar to the daily-data results, we have some reservations with respect
to the serially correlated residuals in the model without lagged dependent
variables (Table 5) and, hence, we focus primarily on the full-blown esti-
mates with 18 lagged dependent variables (Table 6). All   parameters have
the expected negative signs and only four out of the 16 point estimates in
the two sample periods are not statistically different from zero (all either
in the shortest subsample or in the U.S.D data). The estimates indicate that
it would take between 2 and 15 weeks for the exchange rate to return to its
long-term value in the absence of the nonlinear process. The size of the es-
timated   parameters and their statistical significance is comparable to
the daily data models as are the findings with respect to the random walk
hypothesis. The endogenous liquidity hypothesis seems to be validated es-
pecially in the full sample of the Czech koruna and shorter samples of
the Hungarian forint.
For comparison, the median Faruqee-Redding estimate of   for weekly
data (-0.18) in the G-7 countries suggests a faster linear mean-reversion
process than our median estimate of   (–0.15). Our results imply, however,a more forceful nonlinear adjustment: our estimates of   (median of –85)
are a multiple of that for G-7 (median of –15). This is a fairly intuitive re-
sult – it takes a larger departure from the trend in transition economies,
as compared to theG-7 countries, to attract endogenous liquidity to themar-
ket. Nevertheless, given the weight of the linear adjustment process as com-
pared to the nonlinear one, the overall speed of adjustment remains slower
for the Visegrád Four countries as compared to the G-7 countries.
4.3 Volatility of Exchange Rate and Central Bank Interventions
One important question to be examined in interpreting the results is
whether they may, in part, reflect central bank intervention and regulatory
pressures to curb short-term exchange rate volatility.16 We find a limited
role of interventions for volatility smoothing, for the following reasons.
First, most interventions in the Visegrád Four countries were against
the domestic currency, as the authorities tried to limit real appreciation
with little interest in day-to-day nominal volatility (Holub, 2004).17 More-
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TABLE 5 Weekly Data without Lagged Dependent Variables a
Czech Republic Hungary Poland Slovakia
Dollar Euro Dollar Euro Dollar Euro Dollar Euro
Sample period: May 1998–December 2002 (n = 216)
  –0.03932 –0.06595 –0.10352 –0.02543 –0.08316* –0.02849 –0.09276 –0.01522
HACSE (0.0524)( 0.0542)( 0.0630)( 0.0580)( 0.0497)( 0.0633)( 0.0572)( 0.0341)
  –62.088* –123.32 –117.30 –308.80 –33.319 –110.33 –17.700 –180.12***
HACSE (37.04)( 131.5)( 73.32)( 271.7)( 64.03)( 120.4)( 66.60)( 58.99)
DW 1.83 1.69 1.88 2.03 1.86 1.97 1.77 1.86
Autocor. 1.7807* 1.1746 2.6335** 1.6027 1.7495* 2.5691** 3.4597*** 1.5652
R 2 0.0892 0.047 0.086 0.059 0.051 0.055 0.051 0.047
Sample period: May 2000–December 2002 (n = 135)
  –0.04097 –0.02185 –0.07385 –0.01678 –0.09572 –0.02186 –0.13105* –0.08499
HACSE (0.0794)( 0.0721)( 0.0823)( 0.0736)( 0.0643)( 0.0752)( 0.0770)( 0.0607)
  –85.983* –317.37** –129.37 –620.72** 1.8589 –108.75 –34.442 –102.57
HACSE (49.90)( 161.6)( 85.12)( 311.9)( 60.36)( 135.5)( 76.58)( 248.5)
DW 1.89 1.80 1.98 2.06 1.84 2.00 1.78 1.85
Autocor. 1.4643 0.9688 1.9404 2.0512* 0.9668 2.1794** 2.2045 1.5802
R 2 0.062 0.049 0.072 0.101 0.044 0.058 0.068 0.057
Note: a Estimation by ordinary least squares, robust standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity and autocor-
relation are reported in parentheses as ‘HACSE’. The Durbin-Watson and error autocorrelation statistics are
labelled as ‘DW’ and ‘Autocor.’, respectively. The coefficient of determination is R2. The significance level at
1, 5, and 10 percent are denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively. The parameter significance is based on ro-
bust standard errors.
Source: author’s calculations
16 The literature yields little support to the hypothesis that interventions can calm financial
markets or reverse market expectations, although this hypothesis is often seen as the primary
justification for central bank interventions. See (Stix, 2001) for a review.
17 Interventions turned out to be quite costly for central banks as domestic interest rates de-
clined sharply in the late 1990s. Holub (2004) estimated 2001–02 average annual sterilization
cost thereof in the Czech National Bank to be equivalent to 1.5 percent of GDP.225 Finance a úvûr – Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 55, 2005, ã. 5-6
over, quantitative interventions were too small and infrequent to have
amarked impact on exchange rate volatility. For example, theCNB monthly
average of interventions was less than USD 100 million during 2000–2002
or equivalent to about 0.2 percent of the turnover on the koruna market
and those averages were even smaller for Hungary and the Slovak Repub-
lic. Of course, the signalling impact of quantitative interventions is hard to
gauge as it depends on the market structure (Bofinger – Wollmershaeuser,
2001), and (Kim, 2003) or the prevailing volatility regime (Beine – Laurent
– Lecourt, 2003). Even less can be said about regulatory pressures, although
it is known that some foreign exchange market participants may “restrain”
themselves voluntarily if they are worried that the central bank might “pu-
nish” them.
Second, we found no quantitative evidence that interventions may have
curbed exchange rate volatility. Regressing within-the-month volatility of
exchange rates on monthly interventions for theperiod of January 1999–De-
cember 2002, and controlling for contagion and trend-related movements
in the exchange rate, we found that big-intervention months were associ-
ated in a statistically significant manner with bigger volatility and vice
versa in the Czech Republic, while the same exercise for Hungary and
the Slovak Republic yielded statistically insignificant results. Hence, if
the Czech, Hungarian, and Slovak central banks indeed tried to limit daily
volatility of their currencies through quantitative interventions, these ef-
forts do not show in our data.
TABLE 6 Weekly Data with Lagged Dependent Variables a
Czech Republic Hungary Poland Slovakia
Dollar Euro Dollar Euro Dollar Euro Dollar Euro
Sample period: May 1998–December 2002 (n = 216)
  –0.1460** –0.1253** –0.2028*** –0.0814 –0.2171** –0.1839*** –0.1647*** –0.0957**
HACSE (0.0462)( 0.0544)( 0.0590)( 0.0566)( 0.0968)( 0.0706)( 0.0521)( 0.0442)
  –57.678 –261.50 –85.643 –683.54*** 31.272 –83.9694 –40.280 –204.11*
HACSE (44.92)( 169.8)( 78.69)( 262.3)( 70.09)( 119.9)( 61.47)( 110.4)
DW 1.99 2.00 1.97 2.06 1.99 2.00 1.99 2.0
Autocor. 1.0444 1.7225 1.0720 1.9527* 0.9712 2.2851** 0.9875 7.3536***
R 2 0.204 0.217 0.197 0.232 0.138 0.209 0.188 0.154
Sample period: May 2000–December 2002 (n = 135)
  –0.1967*** –0.0938 –0.3607** –0.0448 –0.2374 –0.1443* –0.3007*** –0.1507*
HACSE ( 0.0564)(   0.0716)(   0.1074)(   0.0894)(   0.1533)(   0.0795)(   0.0894)(   0.0795)
  –140.24*** –312.49* –64.6889 –994.60*** 54.021 –110.76 –39.103 –382.82
HACSE ( 50.75)(   186.2)(   84.93)(   323.5)(   89.08)(   127.3)(   84.71)(   247.7)
DW 1.99 2.01 1.96 2.11 1.89 1.96 1.97 2.01
Autocor. 1.1319 4.0984*** 1.0813 4.3844*** 2.8731*** 1.3880 1.1936 1.5713
R 2 0.262 0.190 0.225 0.302 0.135 0.284 0.207 0.242
Note: a 18 lagged values of the dependent variable are included in the regression, but are not reported. Estimation
by ordinary least squares, robust standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation are
reported in parentheses as ‘HACSE’. The Durbin-Watson and error autocorrelation statistics are labelled as
‘DW’ and ‘Autocor.’, respectively. The coefficient of determination is R2. The significance level at 1, 5, and
10 percent are denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively. The parameter significance is based on robust stan-
dard errors.
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4.4 Policy Implications
Our results have some attractive policy implications. First, the results
suggest that early liberalization of the foreign exchange market and finan-
cial-account transactions may pay off in terms of market liquidity and,
hence, faster adjustment of the exchange rate. This would increase the via-
bility of a floating regime, as well as making it more difficult to maintain
a pegged regime. However, early liberalization is a necessary condition, not
a sufficient one. For example, although the Slovak koruna was floated soon
after the Czech koruna, the Slovak market remained thin and the turnover
on the foreign exchange market grew slowly. Similarly, the floating of
the Hungarian forint in 2001 and the rapid growth in turnover appear to
be associated with fast-growing liquidity. Moreover, theresults for theCzech
koruna suggest that a deep, maturing market is likely to be characteriz-
ed by a gradually increasing weight of the linear adjustment processes.
The speed of proportional adjustment of the Czech koruna and, more re-
cently, the Hungarian forint is gradually becoming comparable to that of
the G-7 countries.
Second, central banks need not be overly concerned with short-run volati-
lity of their national exchange rates, given the self-correcting tendencies.
This seems to be the practice of Visegrád Four central banks anyway, for
they “lean against the wind” of real appreciation as compared to smoothing
out short-term fluctuations as suggested by the conventional view of fo-
reign exchange interventions. We even found some evidence that CNB in-
terventions were associated with increased exchange rate volatility.
Third, the endogenous liquidity effects are comparable empirically to
the autoregressive processes of the random walk. Endogenous liquidity does
not imply that the volatility of the nominal exchange rate is lower in a li-
quid market or that the level thereof is closer to its fundamental-based ex-
change rate, it only implies that the self-correcting mechanism is fast.
The endogenous liquidity hypothesis seems to hold especially well in all
samples of the Czech koruna and shorter samples of the Hungarian forint.
Finally, we conjecture that nontransparent exchange rate arrangements
and shallow markets in Poland and the Slovak Republic may have induced
an irregular behavior of the exchange rate. For example, the Polish zloty is
an outlier – in terms of similar volatility of both the dollar and euro ex-
change rates, positive signs of the estimated proportional mean reversion
process ( ), and comparatively large  s in the daily regressions. The results
suggest that the zloty exchange rate adjusts only if the departure from
the trend is large and that in the case of smaller deviations the rate tends
to drift further from the trend, because a limited amount of endogenous li-
quidity is attracted into the market. We find similar results for the euro
rate of the Slovak koruna in the 2001–2002 period.
5. Concluding Remarks
Utilizing the empirical model of Faruqee and Redding (1999), we test en-
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markets. In this model, stabilizing flows of liquidity are attracted to a mar-
ket with a seemingly temporary shock to the exchange rate, reacting dis-
proportionately fast to sizeable deviations from the longer-term exchange
rate path. The testable equation contains a univariate error-correction
mechanism that captures both the linear and nonlinear parts of the mean
reversion process. This “endogenous liquidity” hypothesis suggests also
a second channel through which opening financial markets militates in fa-
vor of exchange rate flexibility: it increases the viability of a floating regime,
as well as making it more difficult to maintain a peg.
The empirical part of the paper validated the theoretical priors and found
that the depth of the market may have implications for the speed of ad-
justment of the error-correction mechanism. We found the strongest sup-
port for the endogenous liquidity hypothesis in the Czech koruna market
and, more recently, also in the Hungarian forint market. Quantitatively,
the results are comparable to those of Faruqee and Redding for G-7 coun-
tries. The model was tested using weekly and daily exchange rate data for
the U.S. dollar and euro against four Central European currencies for
the 1998–2002 sample period, the Czech and Slovak korunas, Hungarian
forint, and Polish zloty. In addition, we found some evidence that central
bank interventions in the foreign exchange market may have fueled ex-
change rate volatility, presumably as a result of the “leaning against
the wind” approach to interventions.
Liquid currencies, that is, those with a sufficient number of market ma-
kers and deep order books, tend to have shorter deviations from the trend
exchange rate. The results seem to suggest a connection between the early
liberalization of the foreign-exchange market and financial-account trans-
actions in the Czech Republic and the resulting, faster-than-average ad-
justment of the Czech koruna to short-term deviations from the trend. A si-
milar link between market deepening and the speed of adjustment of
the exchange rate is observable in the post-2000 Hungarian data. As far as
the out-of-sample forecasting accuracy is concerned, the endogenous-liqui-
dity model performs comparably to the random walk model. We found li-
mited clues, however, as to what is the appropriate frequency for testing
the endogenous liquidity hypothesis – we have to wait for longer time se-
ries under consistent exchange rate arrangements. Further empirical ex-
tensions of the model may want to consider the impact of central bank in-
terventions on the speed of exchange rate adjustment.ANNEX I
The Faruqee-Redding Model of Endogenous Liquidity
This section recapitulates the three-period model presented in (Faruqee – Redding,
1999, 2001). In this model non-informational, noise traders’ demand for liquidity, 
 t   (0, 2
 ), which is positively serially correlated, is met by risk-averse market ma-
kers, Mt, who are willing to speculate in order to collect an end-period expected profit.
Those informational traders choose the optimal asset holding given a utility function
with constant risk aversion,  , in terminal wealth:




where the first right-hand side term measures the end-period expected wealth and
the second denotes the penalty on the variance of wealth. In equilibrium the noise-
-trader demand must equal the market-maker demand:
   2 2
t Pt = EtP3 + ––––– (AI-2)
Mt
Market makers are attracted to markets where noise trading is significant, re-
sulting in additional entry in period 2, providing an expected excess utility of the op-
timal holdings over the initial wealth W0:
(E2P3 – P2)2
U2 – W0 = ––––––––––– (AI-3)
2  2
Using the all-trader equilibrium (AI-2) and inserting into (AI-3) yields:
 2  2 2
2 U2 – W0 = –––––– (AI-4)
2M2
2
Assuming the reservation utility of the marginal market maker to be linear in
the number of market makers, R(M2) =  M2, period 2 entry will be conditional on
surplus from market making (AI-4) exceeding the reservation cost. Hence, the equi-
librium number of market makers will be:
 2  2 2
2 M2 =
3   ––––– (AI-5)
2 
and, consequently, the period 2 price:
P2 = E2P3 + 3     2      2    ( 2 2
2)2 (AI-6)
Non-informational traders have a transitory effect on the exchange rate Pt, while
market makers bring it back to fundamental value. The speed of adjustment – an er-
ror correction metric – varies between 0 (no second-period adjustment) and 1 (full
second-period adjustment):
 E2 (P2 – P3)    = 1 – ––––––––––– (AI-7)
 E1 (P1 – P3) 
Fixing the number of second-period market makers, that is, assuming no endoge-
nous liquidity provision, the error correction mechanism is independent of transitory
demand ( ),   = 1 –  2 2
2 M1 / 2 2
1 M2. Using equation (AI-2) to incorporate the effect of
endogenous liquidity, the metric increases in the absolute value of transitory demand
( ):
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2   = 1 – 
3    ––––– ––– M1 (AI-8)
  2 2 2
2  2 2
1
Intuitively, this result indicates that a large non-informational, first-period trad-
ing encourages more forceful return toward fundamental value in the next period,
both on an absolute and proportional basis    /      0.
ANNEX II
The Meese-Rogoff “Race”
Comparing out-of-sample forecasting accuracy, or the so-called Meese and Rogoff
(1983) “race”, of the various empirical models used in this paper, we find that the pure
random walk model (column 1) performs quite similarly to the Faruqee-Redding
model without lagged variables (column 2). More specifically, the random-walk
model’s root mean square errors (RMSE) are marginally lower than those of the en-
dogenous liquidity model for the Czech koruna and the zloty, but marginally higher
for the forint and the Slovak koruna. Predictably, the Faruqee-Redding model with
lagged variables (column 3) shows lower RMSE than either of the two preceding mo-
dels for most currencies and forecasting periods.
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Period of  Random Model of Model of
forecast walk model endogenous endogenous
(1) liquidity liquidity with
(2) random walk
(3)
CZK/EUR 1 week 0.217 0.226 0.204
2 weeks 0.167 0.175 0.157
1 month 0.172 0.173 0.163
Exclusion restrictiona NA NA 1.544
HUF/EUR 1 week 0.060 0.051 0.054
2 weeks 0.073 0.064 0.074
1 month 0.089 0.087 0.093
Exclusion restrictiona NA NA 2.808
PZL/EUR 1 week 0.176 0.188 0.174
2 weeks 0.181 0.193 0.184
1 month 0.154 0.164 0.154
Exclusion restrictiona NA NA 2.192
SLK/EUR 1 week 0.254 0.236 0.237
2 weeks 0.258 0.253 0.249
1 month 0.212 0.209 0.205
Exclusion restrictiona NA NA 4.300
TABLE AII-1 Root Mean Square Forecast Error in Out-of-Sample Estimates of Equation (AI-4)
(RMSE x 100)
Note: a An F-test of joint exclusion of lagged variables, distributed as F(24,1114).
Source: Author’s calculations; daily data. The estimated RMSE are derived from the following equations:
24




 et = nt–1 +   (nt–1)3 +    i et–i +  t, respectively
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SUMMARY 
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Liberalized Markets Have More Stable Exchange
Rates: 
Short-Run Evidence from Four Transition Countries
Aleš BULÍŘ – International Monetary Fund (abulir@imf.org)
The paper looks at the hypothesis that financial-market liberalization can create
a basis for more stable exchange rates, as deviations of exchange rates from equi-
librium levels bring forth stabilizing flows of liquidity. This hypothesis suggests that
opening up financial markets militates in favor of exchange-rate flexibility by in-
creasing the viability of a floating regime as well as making it more difficult to main-
tain a peg. The paper examines this hypothesis in a sample of four transition
economies and finds that exchange rates tend to return faster to their Hodrick-
-Prescott-based values where markets are liberalized. The results suggest that early
and successful foreign-exchange liberalization pays off in terms of depth of the mar-
ket and, hence, faster adjustment of the exchange rate to shocks. Moreover, it im-
plies that central banks should not be overly concerned with short-run volatility of
their national exchange rates.